A B.C. judge found that American agents violated Canadian sovereignty, operated behind the RCMP’s back and pushed a Canadian into criminal conduct. Then the public judgment arrived with virtually every meaningful name, date and location removed.
This is nuts.
In Named Person, 2026 BCSC 571, Justice Catherine Murray of the Supreme Court of British Columbia permanently stayed an American extradition proceeding because of what she found the United States Drug Enforcement Administration had done inside Canada.
This was not a minor paperwork error. It was not an innocent misunderstanding between two police agencies. According to the court, the DEA deliberately operated in Canada without lawful Canadian authorization, concealed its activities from the RCMP and induced a Canadian resident to participate in conduct that amounted to a money-laundering conspiracy.
The judge called the DEA’s behaviour “shocking and flagrant.”
She found that the agency committed a “deliberate, calculated and ongoing infringement” of the Canadian’s constitutional rights and acted “in violation of Canadian sovereignty.”
Read the judgment yourself:
Named Person, 2026 BCSC 571 — CanLII
Do not take my word for it. Read what the judge actually found.
What the DEA allegedly did in Canada
The person at the centre of the case is identified only as “Named Person” or “NP.”
The DEA agent is identified only as “Jane Doe.”
The other people, police officers, locations, dates, alleged drugs and operational details are substantially redacted.
What remains visible is extraordinary.
According to the judgment, a DEA agent attended at NP’s Canadian home accompanied by two Canadian police officers. The court found that those Canadian officers were acting outside their territorial jurisdictions and that none of them had the authority required to conduct the operation.
NP was subsequently called to three meetings with American investigators and eventually entered into an agreement to assist the DEA with an investigation targeting another individual.
The DEA then directed NP to arrange the movement of money for the target.
Justice Murray found that this plan constituted a conspiracy to launder money and that the DEA was leading NP into criminal conduct. NP was sent outside Canada to participate in the operation and returned believing that his life was in danger.
Think about that.
A foreign police agency allegedly recruited a person inside Canada, directed him into criminal conduct and exposed him to potentially deadly consequences—all without proper Canadian authorization or supervision.
Get this … this is para 2 in the Canlii case file… only para 2 and its explosive if you just stew on it and really get what it means:
The Immunity Agreement Changes the Story
Paragraph 2 of the judgment contains one of its most revealing passages:
[2] NP brings this application asserting that the actions of the RS constituted an abuse of process and, as a consequence, this proceeding should be stayed. He takes the position that the United States Drug Enforcement Agency’s Special Agent [Jane Doe] and other US agents committed illegal acts in Canada and induced him to do the same. NP further says that US authorities are in violation of an immunity agreement made by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) in exchange for NP’s cooperation as a confidential source and undercover agent in a money laundering investigation based in [REDACTED]. Accordingly, he claims that if this extradition proceeding against him was to continue, these abuses of process and the prejudice to the justice system will be perpetuated.
This paragraph is telling for several reasons.
First, “RS” means the Requesting State—the United States. NP was arguing that the conduct of the country seeking his extradition amounted to an abuse of the Canadian judicial process.
Second, NP was not merely someone who passed along a tip to American authorities. According to his position before the court, the DEA recruited him to cooperate as both a confidential source and an undercover agent in a money-laundering investigation.
That distinction matters.
A confidential source normally provides information to investigators. An undercover operative may go further by meeting targets, carrying messages, arranging transactions or participating in controlled activity at the direction of law enforcement. NP alleged that the DEA did not simply ask him for information—it induced him to engage in conduct that would otherwise be illegal in Canada.
Third, NP said the DEA offered him an immunity agreement in exchange for that cooperation.
An immunity agreement is supposed to protect a cooperating person from prosecution for conduct covered by the agreement, subject to its precise wording and any conditions attached to it. In practical terms, NP’s position was:
You asked me to work for you. You directed my conduct. You promised me protection in exchange for my cooperation. Now the United States is attempting to prosecute or extradite me despite that agreement.
That is far more serious than a dispute over investigative procedure. It raises questions about whether American agents used promises of immunity to secure NP’s cooperation, exposed him to criminal and personal danger, and then allowed American authorities to proceed against him anyway.
Fourth, the money-laundering investigation was based in a location the court has deliberately removed from the public judgment. The words “based in [REDACTED]” confirm that an identifiable geographic centre existed, but they do not reveal whether it was in Canada, the United States or another country. Nor do they establish where NP lived.
The location may have been redacted because identifying it could reveal the American target, the investigative organization, NP’s identity or an ongoing related operation.
Finally, paragraph 2 explains why NP requested the extraordinary remedy of a stay of proceedings. He argued that permitting the extradition case to continue would allow the United States to benefit from the very misconduct it allegedly committed.
A stay is among the most serious remedies available to a Canadian court. It stops the proceeding because continuing it would cause greater damage to the integrity of the justice system than ending it. Justice Catherine Murray ultimately agreed that the misconduct was sufficiently egregious to require that result.
The sequence alleged by NP—and substantially accepted by the court—was extraordinary:
- DEA agents operated inside Canada without following the required Canadian protocols.
- They recruited NP as a confidential source and undercover operative.
- They offered him immunity in exchange for his cooperation.
- They induced him to participate in conduct that was illegal under Canadian law without proper RCMP authorization or supervision.
- They sent him into an operation that left him believing his life was in danger.
- Despite the promised protection, American authorities pursued an extradition proceeding against him.
- The B.C. Supreme Court concluded that allowing the proceeding to continue would compromise the integrity of the Canadian justice system.
That does not mean every assertion NP initially made was automatically proven merely because it appears in paragraph 2. Paragraph 2 summarizes NP’s position on the application. The critical point is that the court later examined the evidence and ultimately found the DEA’s misconduct sufficiently “shocking and flagrant” to justify permanently staying the proceeding.
This is not simply a story about foreign agents forgetting to complete the correct paperwork.
It is a story about a Canadian resident who said he was recruited by the DEA, promised immunity, used as a confidential source and undercover operative, induced to participate in criminal conduct and then subjected to an American extradition proceeding anyway.
And the location of the money-laundering investigation—the detail that could help the public understand who and what this operation involved—remains hidden behind one word:
[REDACTED].
Now on to Paragraph 7 which is equally mind numbing:
And Get This: “Cooperate—or We Will Seek an Indictment”
Paragraph 7 reveals how the DEA and the accompanying Canadian detectives obtained NP’s cooperation:
[7] At NP’s request, they met at a nearby coffee shop. There, [one of the detectives] told NP that they believed that he had information that could assist them and that his best option was to talk to them. [The detective] advised NP to think about his future [REDACTED]. SA [Doe] told NP that he was in serious trouble in the US and that he had three options: he could run and eventually they would find him, he could go to prison, or he could cooperate with them. [Doe], too, stated that cooperating was his best option. SA [Doe] advised NP that he had not yet been indicted for his drug activity in [REDACTED] and that, if he cooperated with them to obtain information about persons involved in criminal activity, the US would not pursue criminal charges against him. But if he did not cooperate she would return to [REDACTED] and seek an indictment against him. NP told SA [Doe] that he needed to speak to his lawyer, [REDACTED]. The meeting was halted to allow NP an opportunity to contact counsel.
Read that again.
NP was told that he had three supposed options:
- Run—and eventually be found.
- Go to prison.
- Cooperate with the DEA.
That is not an ordinary request for voluntary assistance. It is an ultimatum delivered by an American federal agent inside Canada, reinforced by Canadian detectives telling NP that talking to them was his “best option.”
The most important part is the promise that followed.
Special Agent Jane Doe told NP that he had not yet been indicted for his alleged drug activity and that the United States would not pursue charges if he cooperated and obtained information about other people involved in criminal activity.
But if he refused, Doe said she would return to the redacted American jurisdiction and seek an indictment against him.
In plain language, the proposition was:
Work for us and we will not charge you. Refuse, and we will pursue an indictment.
That is the foundation of the immunity issue.
NP’s cooperation was not allegedly obtained through a vague suggestion that authorities might “put in a good word” for him. The agent reportedly connected his decision directly to whether the United States would pursue criminal charges.
The passage also raises serious questions about voluntariness. NP may technically have had choices, but they were presented as running, imprisonment or cooperation. The threat of an indictment was used as leverage while Canadian detectives stood beside the DEA agent and encouraged him to cooperate.
The Canadian Detectives Were Not Passive Bystanders
The involvement of the Canadian detectives matters.
One detective reportedly told NP that authorities believed he possessed useful information and that speaking with them was his best option. The detective also advised NP to think about his future, followed by words that remain redacted.
We should not speculate about what those concealed words contain. They might concern NP’s family, employment, freedom, immigration status or something entirely different. The public judgment does not tell us.
But the redaction removes potentially important context about the pressure being applied.
The Canadian detective’s participation may also have given the encounter an appearance of domestic legitimacy. NP was not dealing solely with an American agent who had unexpectedly appeared inside Canada. Canadian police officers were present and actively encouraged him to cooperate.
A reasonable person in NP’s position could have interpreted their presence as confirmation that the operation was authorized by Canadian authorities.
The court later found that the DEA was operating behind the RCMP’s back and outside the required protocols. That makes the Canadian officers’ participation even more troubling.
Who were they?
Which police services employed them?
Why were they acting outside their territorial jurisdictions?
Who told them they were authorized to accompany the DEA agent?
Did they know the DEA had not contacted the RCMP as required?
What did they understand about the immunity offer?
None of those questions can be answered from the heavily redacted public judgment.
NP Asked for a Lawyer
There is one important qualification: when NP said that he needed to speak with his lawyer, the meeting was stopped so he could contact counsel.
That matters and should be acknowledged.
But allowing NP to contact a lawyer does not resolve the larger problem. Before the meeting stopped, he had already been confronted at his home, brought to a nearby coffee shop, told by Canadian detectives that cooperation was his best option and presented by the DEA with the stark choice of running, prison or cooperation.
His lawyer’s name is also redacted.
That concealment may be necessary because identifying counsel could lead directly to NP’s identity or the underlying American proceeding. Nevertheless, it removes another potentially traceable part of the public record.
What the Redactions Conceal
Paragraph 7 contains at least four significant concealed details:
- what the Canadian detective told NP to consider about his future;
- where the alleged drug activity occurred;
- where Doe threatened to seek the indictment; and
- the identity of NP’s lawyer.
The location of the alleged drug activity and the jurisdiction where the indictment would be sought may be the same place, but the public version does not permit us to confirm that.
Those locations could reveal which DEA field office or United States Attorney’s Office controlled the investigation. They might also reveal the alleged trafficking route and the identity of the American target.
The lawyer’s identity could expose the related criminal proceedings and ultimately identify NP.
The redactions therefore protect NP and potentially sensitive operations—but they also prevent the public from determining which American and Canadian institutions participated in conduct the court found unlawful.
Why Paragraph 7 Is So Important
Paragraph 7 helps explain why the later extradition proceeding was so offensive to the integrity of the justice system.
The United States allegedly told NP:
Cooperate and we will not pursue charges against you.
NP then agreed to cooperate, entered into an immunity arrangement and acted as a confidential source and undercover operative in a DEA-directed money-laundering investigation.
Yet the United States ultimately sought to extradite him.
That is the heart of the problem. American agents allegedly used the threat of prosecution to secure NP’s assistance, promised that charges would not be pursued if he cooperated, exposed him to criminal conduct and personal danger—and then attempted to prosecute him anyway.
Justice Murray did not permanently stay the proceeding because she felt sorry for an alleged drug trafficker. She stayed it because allowing the United States to benefit from this conduct would compromise the integrity of the Canadian justice system.
Paragraph 7 strips away the bureaucratic language.
The message delivered to NP inside Canada was brutally simple:
Cooperate with us, or we will charge you.
And according to the judgment, the foreign agents delivering that ultimatum were not operating under the lawful Canadian supervision that the DEA–RCMP protocols required.
The DEA–RCMP memorandum and operating protocols
Foreign law-enforcement officers do not acquire police powers merely by crossing the Canadian border.
The DEA has representatives in Canada, and cooperation between American and Canadian agencies is normal. Cross-border investigations may be necessary, particularly in cases involving drugs, organized crime and money laundering.
But cooperation is supposed to operate through Canadian law and established protocols.
The judgment discusses a memorandum of understanding and operating arrangements governing DEA activity in Canada. Those safeguards require foreign officers to coordinate with Canadian authorities. Canadian law-enforcement agencies are supposed to know about, authorize and supervise operational activity conducted on Canadian soil.
Those rules exist for a reason.
They protect Canadian sovereignty. They help ensure compliance with the Charter. They establish responsibility and accountability. They also prevent foreign agents from running unauthorized operations against Canadians inside Canada.
Justice Murray found that the DEA agent knew about the applicable protocols.
The court’s conclusion was not that the agent accidentally misunderstood them. It was that the DEA chose to operate behind the RCMP’s back.
The judgment also says the DEA later gave the RCMP misleading information about what had occurred.
That is an institutional bombshell.
If a foreign agent knowingly bypassed the rules, concealed an operation from Canada’s national police force and then provided misleading information about it, Canadians deserve to know exactly how that happened.
The RCMP’s role demands scrutiny too
The judgment does not find that the RCMP authorized the DEA’s unlawful conduct. In fact, the court found that the DEA operated behind the RCMP’s back.
That distinction matters.
But it does not end the Canadian accountability questions.
Two Canadian police officers reportedly accompanied the DEA agent to NP’s home even though the court found that they lacked the necessary territorial authority. The judgment also raises obvious questions about when the RCMP learned what had happened, what information it received, whether that information was verified and what corrective action followed.
The public deserves clear answers:
- Which Canadian police services employed the two accompanying officers?
- Who authorized their participation?
- What did those officers believe they were authorized to do?
- When did the RCMP first learn the full extent of the DEA operation?
- What misleading information was provided to the RCMP?
- Did the RCMP investigate the conduct once it became known?
- Were any officers or agents disciplined?
- Were Canadian prosecutors or federal officials notified?
- Has the DEA–RCMP memorandum been revised since this occurred?
- What safeguards now prevent another unauthorized foreign operation?
A court permanently stayed a serious extradition case because the misconduct was so egregious that allowing the prosecution to continue would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
That cannot be where accountability ends.
Everybody is “Named Person,” “Jane Doe” or black ink
The public version of this judgment is extraordinarily redacted.
NP’s identity is concealed. So is the identity of the DEA agent. The identities of the Canadian police officers and investigative targets are removed. Important dates, locations, operational details and even the type of drug involved are apparently withheld.
There may be legitimate legal reasons for some of these protections. Courts routinely protect confidential informants, undercover officers, sensitive investigative techniques, people facing unresolved proceedings and individuals whose safety could be endangered by disclosure.
Those protections matter.
But the scale of the redactions creates a serious public-accountability problem.
Canadians are being told that a foreign law-enforcement agency carried out an unlawful operation in this country, violated a Canadian’s constitutional rights, disregarded protocols, misled the RCMP and compromised Canadian sovereignty.
Yet the public cannot identify the responsible agent, the participating Canadian officers, the police services involved, the location of the operation or the officials who knew about it.
That may protect legitimate interests, but it also shields institutions from scrutiny.
The answer is not necessarily to publish every operational detail or expose anyone to danger. The answer is for responsible authorities to provide the maximum disclosure consistent with genuine safety, privacy and fair-trial concerns.
Redaction must not become institutional camouflage.
The court drew the line
Justice Murray concluded that allowing the extradition proceeding to continue would effectively condone the DEA’s conduct.
She wrote that the public would be outraged by what happened. She recognized the strong public interest in prosecuting serious drug-trafficking and exportation offences, but found that the misconduct crossed a line the justice system could not ignore.
That is what a constitutional remedy is supposed to do.
A stay of proceedings is not a declaration that the allegations against NP were harmless. It is a declaration that the state—and foreign agents acting inside Canada—cannot obtain a prosecution through conduct that fundamentally violates Canadian law and constitutional principles.
The seriousness of the alleged offence does not give police unlimited authority.
Badges do not erase borders.
A memorandum of understanding is not optional.
Foreign police cannot secretly exercise state power inside Canada and then expect Canadian courts to clean up the consequences.
Who authorized this—and what happened afterward?
This judgment should trigger much more than a few news stories.
The federal ministers responsible for Public Safety, Justice and Foreign Affairs should explain what they know about the case. The RCMP should explain how Canadian officers became involved and what happened after the misconduct was discovered. The DEA should disclose whether its agent was investigated or disciplined. Parliament should determine whether existing agreements give Canadians enough transparency and protection when foreign agents operate here.
At minimum, the public deserves:
- A formal Canadian review of the DEA operation and the involvement of Canadian officers.
- Disclosure of the applicable DEA–RCMP memorandum and operational protocols, subject only to narrowly justified redactions.
- An explanation of what corrective measures followed the court’s findings.
- Confirmation of whether disciplinary, criminal or professional investigations occurred.
- A public accounting of how foreign operations in Canada are authorized, recorded, supervised and audited.
- A review of whether the judgment can be republished with fewer redactions once legitimate legal risks have passed.
The Canadian justice system did the right thing by distancing itself from the misconduct.
Now the institutions involved must do something much harder: explain who did what, who knew about it and why Canadians should believe it cannot happen again.
Until then, we are left with one of the most disturbing Canadian court decisions in recent memory—a foreign police agency found to have violated Canadian sovereignty, a Canadian reportedly placed in danger and a public record in which almost everybody responsible remains hidden behind a pseudonym or a wall of black ink.
That is not enough accountability.
That is the beginning of the questions.
Source: Named Person, 2026 BCSC 571, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Justice Catherine Murray, decision dated April 1, 2026.
Read the complete public judgment:
https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2026/2026bcsc571/2026bcsc571.html
Commentary and opinion based on the publicly available, redacted judgment. Allegations and factual descriptions should be understood in accordance with the court’s findings and the limits of the published record.
The Judge’s Ruling Says It All
Justice Catherine Murray granted a stay of proceedings. Her conclusion requires no embellishment:
[113] On balance, I conclude that the public would be outraged by the conduct of the DEA in this case. Canadian citizens have the right to be free from foreign interference in Canada. That means they must be protected from illegal actions of foreign operators. While there is a high public interest in seeing trafficking and exporting charges prosecuted, the behaviour of the DEA in this case is so shocking and flagrant that the justice system must distance itself from it. To allow the proceedings to continue would be to condone it.
Read those words again:
“Canadian citizens have the right to be free from foreign interference in Canada.”
And again:
“The behaviour of the DEA in this case is so shocking and flagrant that the justice system must distance itself from it.”
The judge stayed the proceeding because allowing it to continue would amount to condoning what the DEA had done.
That says it all.
And One More Uncomfortable Question
If this judgment proves that DEA agents were capable of operating inside Canada without the RCMP’s knowledge or authorization, is it really too difficult to believe that another American agency—or someone claiming to work for one—could also operate here without local authorities knowing the whole story?
That brings me back to the questions I have raised about Michael Martinz in Kelowna.
Let me be precise: I am not claiming that the DEA case proves Michael Martinz worked for the CIA. It does not. The DEA and CIA are separate agencies, and Named Person, 2026 BCSC 571 establishes no connection between Martinz and either organization.
So why do I keep raising the CIA question?
I raise it because Martinz allegedly made statements about his background or connections that caused me to question whether he worked for, claimed to work for or had some other relationship with an American intelligence agency. I also say that he approached me in September 2025, presented himself as someone who wanted to help expose alleged wrongdoing involving his former fiancée and encouraged me to contact other people on his behalf.
I have further raised concerns about subsequent communications and recordings allegedly connected to a conspiracy discussed in the period before the January 22, 2026 firebombing of my family’s home. Whether Martinz’s representations were truthful, exaggerated, misleading or completely false remains unresolved.
Those are my allegations and concerns. They require evidence and an independent investigation. They are not findings made by a court.
The relevance of the DEA decision is narrower—but still important.
Before this judgment, someone might dismiss my questions by saying that an American agency simply could not conduct an unauthorized operation in Canada without the RCMP knowing about it. Justice Catherine Murray’s decision shows that this assumption is false.
The court found that the DEA:
- conducted operational activity inside Canada without proper Canadian authorization;
- knowingly disregarded the protocols governing its work here;
- operated behind the RCMP’s back;
- directed a Canadian into conduct the court characterized as a money-laundering conspiracy;
- exposed that person to serious danger; and
- later provided misleading information to the RCMP.
That does not validate every allegation involving intelligence activity in Canada. It does establish that secrecy, compartmentalization and the existence of formal agreements do not guarantee that Canadian authorities know everything a foreign agency or its personnel are doing here.
My earlier blog also examined the case of a genuine senior CIA officer accused of serious financial misconduct. That example did not prove anything about Martinz either. Its relevance was that employment by an intelligence agency does not make criminal or dishonest conduct impossible. A classified position is not a certificate of good character, and secrecy can sometimes make misconduct more difficult to identify.
Put together, my reasoning is this:
- I say Martinz made or was associated with representations that caused me to question whether he had an intelligence connection.
- His subsequent conduct and communications, in my view, created questions that should have been independently investigated.
- The case of a genuine CIA officer accused of serious misconduct demonstrates that intelligence work and alleged criminal activity are not mutually exclusive.
- Named Person demonstrates that an American agency can operate unlawfully in Canada while bypassing the very Canadian authorities supposedly responsible for oversight.
- None of this proves that Martinz worked for the CIA—but it makes dismissal without investigation intellectually indefensible.
The proper questions remain:
- Did Michael Martinz ever represent that he worked for or had connections with the CIA?
- What exactly did he say about his background, work and associations?
- Was any such representation true, exaggerated, misleading or completely fabricated?
- Did he have any formal, informal, direct or indirect relationship with an intelligence or law-enforcement organization?
- What was he doing in Kelowna, and with whom was he communicating?
- Were his relevant communications, financial activities and movements independently examined?
- Did Canadian authorities investigate the alleged representations or dismiss them because they sounded improbable?
- If an investigation occurred, what evidence was reviewed and what conclusion was reached?
I do not expect readers to accept my suspicions as established fact. I expect the responsible authorities to preserve the evidence, investigate the representations and provide a defensible answer.
After Named Person, 2026 BCSC 571, nobody can honestly argue that covert American law-enforcement activity inside Canada—conducted without proper RCMP knowledge or authorization—is inherently impossible.
The court has established otherwise.
For the complete background to my questions concerning Michael Martinz, the CIA and the distinction between suspicion and proof, read:
Is It Impossible for Michael Martinz to Be a White-Collar Criminal and Work for the CIA in Canada? Hmm…
Editor’s note: The statements concerning Michael Martinz are the author’s allegations, questions and opinions. They have not been proven in court. The DEA judgment does not establish any connection between Martinz and the CIA, DEA or any other government agency. The judgment is cited only as evidence that unauthorized American law-enforcement activity has occurred inside Canada without proper RCMP knowledge or authorization.
Addendum: Read the Judgment and Other Coverage for Yourself
Readers should not rely exclusively on my interpretation of this case. The complete public judgment and independent news coverage are available below.
The Primary Court Record
The most authoritative source is Justice Catherine Murray’s published decision:
Named Person, 2026 BCSC 571 — CanLII
The judgment is heavily redacted, but it contains the court’s findings about the DEA’s activities in Canada, the applicable RCMP protocols, the constitutional violations and the reasons the extradition proceeding was permanently stayed.
Vancouver Sun Coverage
Veteran crime reporter Kim Bolan reported on the case for the Vancouver Sun:
DEA operated “illegally” in Canada, B.C. Supreme Court judge says
The article discusses the DEA’s approach to the unnamed Canadian, the agency’s failure to notify the RCMP, the copying of information from his BlackBerry and the attempt to involve him in a money-laundering operation directed at another target.
The Vancouver Sun article may be behind a subscription wall.
CBC News Coverage
CBC News also examined the decision:
B.C. judge tosses drug case, says U.S. agents broke law and violated Canadian sovereignty
CBC focuses on Justice Murray’s conclusion that the DEA’s conduct was “shocking and flagrant,” violated Canadian sovereignty and required the justice system to distance itself from the resulting extradition proceeding.
My Related Commentary
For the background to my separate questions about Michael Martinz and his alleged or claimed intelligence connections, read:
That article does not claim that the DEA judgment proves Martinz worked for the CIA. It explains why I believe his alleged representations, background, communications and possible connections warrant proper investigation instead of dismissal without examining the evidence.
I encourage readers to examine the judgment, compare the news coverage and form their own conclusions.
The essential facts should not be lost in anyone’s commentary—including mine: a B.C. Supreme Court judge found that American DEA agents operated unlawfully inside Canada, disregarded established protocols, worked behind the RCMP’s back, provided the RCMP with misleading information and violated a Canadian’s constitutional rights and Canadian sovereignty.
Everything beyond those judicial findings must be identified honestly as allegation, inference, question or opinion.
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